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Commentary on Emerson v. Magendantz 
lucinda m. finley 
introduction 
The desire to control fertility and childbearing has long been a human 
imperative. Recognizing how fundamentally the “decision whether to bear 
or beget a child” can affect one’s life, in the early 1970s the US Supreme 
Court gave constitutional protection to this decision in landmark cases involv 
ing access to contraception and abortion.1 Even before constitutional law 
recognized a woman’s right to control her reproductive destiny, courts 
grappled with repercussions of medical negligence that impinged on this 
right. These cases fall into two distinct categories: cases involving women 
who did not want any children or additional children, and cases involving 
women who wanted children free from congenital disease or disability.2 These 
cases typically present medical malpractice claims involving the failure prop 
erly to perform a tubal ligation or vasectomy,3 or failure to inform a parent of 
the likelihood a pregnancy would result in a child with birth defects or a 
genetic disease, thereby depriving a woman of her right to make an informed 
decision about whether to conceive, or if already pregnant, to have an 
abortion.4 
1 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
2 See Barbara Pfeiffer Billauer, The Sperminator as a Public Nuisance: Redressing Wrongful Life 
Claims in New Ways (Aka New Tricks for Old Torts), 42 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 1 (2019). 
3 See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (failed sterilization procedure led to 
unwanted pregnancy and childbirth); Christensen v. Thornby, 255 N.W. 620 (Minn. 1934) 
(husband’s failed vasectomy led to wife’s unwanted pregnancy that threatened her health). 
4 Many of the earliest cases in this category arose from the rubella epidemic and involved claims 
that a doctor negligently failed to inform the pregnant woman of the risks of having a disabled 
child due to German measles exposure. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 
(N.J. 1967); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975). Some states have statutorily banned 
wrongful birth actions that involve a claim that but for a physician’s negligence a woman 
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Along the way, courts have used various names to identify these claims. The 
terminology, and judicial receptivity to the claims, varies according to whether 
the plaintiff is the child born with a disabling condition, or the parents who 
wanted to avoid having a child. When the claim is brought on behalf of a 
child who never would have been conceived, or would have been aborted, but 
for the defendant’s negligence, courts have called the claim “wrongful life.” 
All but a few states reject such claims, reasoning that “[w]hether it is better 
never to have been born at all than to have been born with even gross 
deficiencies is a mystery more properly to be left to the philosophers and the 
theologians.”5 In contrast, when the claim is brought by parents for damages 
resulting from an unwanted pregnancy and subsequent birth, courts com 
monly use the term “wrongful birth,”6 and these claims are widely allowed. 
Some courts further refine the terminology, using the terms “wrongful con 
ception” or “wrongful pregnancy” for those cases where a failed sterilization 
procedure results in the birth of a healthy child.7 
the measure of damages 
While courts have overwhelmingly approved claims for wrongful birth, wrong 
ful pregnancy, or wrongful conception, determining the measure of damages 
has been fraught with contention. Only one state high court has denied 
recovery outright, reasoning that the birth of a healthy child presents no 
compensable injury.8 All the other state courts to have addressed these claims 
do recognize that there is some injury from an unwanted pregnancy, but the 
majority of courts allow only limited recovery, which generally includes the 
costs of the initial failed sterilization procedure and of the subsequent correct 
ive procedure, medical expenses for prenatal care and the childbirth and 
would have chosen to abort. See Cailin Harris, Statutory Prohibitions on Wrongful Birth 
Claims and Their Dangerous Effects on Parents, 34 B.C.J. L. & Soc. Just. 365 (2014). 
5 Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978). Only California, Washington, and New 
Jersey permit “wrongful life” claims by the disabled child. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 
165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, 
Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 495 (Wash. 1983). See generally Barbara Pfeiffer Billauer, “Wrongful Life” in 
the Age of Crispr-Cas, 142 Penn State L. Rev. (2020). 
6 Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1981). 
7 See James v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 879 (W. Va. 1985); Chaffee v. Seslar, 786 N.E.2d 
705 (Ind. 2003). 
8 Szekeres v. Robinson, 715 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Nev. 1986). 
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immediate postpartum care.9 Some courts also allow damages for emotional 
distress10 and lost wages related to the pregnancy.11 
The major disagreement involves the cost of raising the healthy child. Only 
two state courts allow full recovery for child rearing costs. Courts denying full 
recovery raise public policy arguments such as resistance to categorizing a 
healthy child as a harm,12 or allege difficulty in valuing these claims.13 The 
most common rationale that courts give for denying full recovery for the costs 
of rearing a healthy child is based on what has been called the benefit offset 
rule. This rule, derived from Restatement (Second) Torts §920, provides that 
the costs of rearing a healthy child should be offset by the benefits, either 
emotional or economic, that the child brings to the parents’ lives. 
The case of Emerson v. Magendantz14 presents a classic wrongful pregnancy 
fact pattern of a failed sterilization operation, and sets forth the issue of the 
appropriate measure of damages in stark relief. This makes it an excellent 
vehicle to investigate the romanticized stereotypes about children, rooted in 
ideology that presumes the centrality and unmitigated joy of motherhood in 
women’s lives, that permeate the reasoning of courts that bar full recovery. By 
the time Emerson was decided in 1997, thirty six US jurisdictions had 
approved the validity of wrongful birth claims, including wrongful conception 
and pregnancy. In Rhode Island, however, the matter was still one of first 
impression, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court extensively surveyed the 
various approaches taken by other courts. 
EMERSON  V. MAGENDANTZ  
Diane and Thomas Emerson already had one child and determined they 
could not afford another when Emerson sought a tubal ligation from 
obstetrician gynecologist Dr. Henry Magendantz. The operation was a failure, 
and a year later Emerson gave birth to a daughter, Kirsten, born with congeni 
tal deformities. After the birth, Emerson underwent a second tubal ligation. 
She and her husband later brought suit, claiming that she suffered severe 
physical pain and emotional distress, required additional invasive medical 
treatment and sustained lost wages and diminished earning capacity. 
9 See, e.g., James, 332 S.E.2d at  879. 
10 See, e.g., Speck, 439 A.2d 110. 
11 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 343 S.E.2d 301, 305 (Va. 1986). 
12 See, e.g., Johnson v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, 540 N.E.2d 1370, 1378 (Ohio 1989). 
13 See, e.g., McKernan v. Aasheim, 687 P.2d 850, 855 (Wash. 1984). 
14 
689 A.2d 409 (R.I. 1997). 
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Additionally, the Emersons sought recompense for their existing and future 
obligations to financially care for their daughter. 
Defendant Magendantz moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that 
Rhode Island law should not recognize a tort claim for a failed sterilization 
procedure because the resulting child was a “precious gift.” The trial court, 
seeking definitive guidance on the legal issues at the heart of the motion to 
dismiss, certified to the Rhode Island Supreme Court the questions of whether 
this tort claim should be allowed, and, if so, what damages should be awarded. 
After an extensive review of existing precedent, the Supreme Court, following 
the majority of American jurisdictions, held that a cause of action existed for 
negligent performance of sterilization when a patient subsequently becomes 
pregnant and delivers a child. The court, however, offered no independent 
analysis of the reasons for allowing the claim or of the nature of the interests 
harmed. 
The court then turned its attention to the measure of damages, noting the 
three different types of remedies that other courts had allowed: limited recov 
ery consisting of the expenses of and pain and suffering from pregnancy and 
delivery and the subsequent sterilization; full recovery for all foreseeable 
damages including the costs of child rearing; and full recovery but with the 
costs of child rearing offset by the benefits derived by the parents from having a 
healthy child. 
Faced with these alternatives regarding the damage claim, by a 3:2 vote the 
court rejected both full recovery including child rearing costs for a healthy 
child, and the benefit offset approach, and instead adopted the limited recov 
ery rule, albeit a variant which excludes the mother’s emotional distress 
incident to the pregnancy. In support of their decision, the Emerson majority 
reasoned that “the public policy of this state would preclude the granting of 
rearing costs for a healthy child whose parents . . .  have decided to retain the 
child as their own with all the joys and benefits that are derived from 
parenthood.”15 The fact that the parents decided to keep the child rather than 
pursue abortion or adoption “constitutes most persuasive evidence that the 
parents consider the benefit of retaining the child to outweigh the economic 
costs of child rearing.”16 
If the child, such as Kirsten Emerson, was born with congenital defects, the 
Emerson majority decided that the parents could recover the extraordinary 
costs of raising a disabled child that exceeded the costs associated with rearing 
a nondisabled child. The majority further expanded the allowable damages for 
15 
689 A.2d at  413. 
16 Id. 
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a disabled child when the physician had reason to know that there was a 
likelihood that any pregnancy resulting from a failed sterilization could result 
in a physically or mentally handicapped child. In these circumstances which 
did not apply to the Emersons − the parents would be able to recover all of the 
costs of raising the child throughout its life, offset only by any governmental 
benefits received, plus emotional distress from the disability.17 
Two justices, while concurring with the decision to recognize the wrongful 
pregnancy cause of action, dissented from the limitation on recoverable 
damages. The dissenters noted that the case was a straightforward medical 
malpractice action, and thus should be treated in accordance with the normal 
tort principle that all foreseeable damages are recoverable and the costs of 
raising a child that results from a failed sterilization are certainly foreseeable. 
The dissent chastised the majority’s treatment of parents’ decision to keep a 
child rather than choose adoption or abortion as evidence that the parents 
considered the child a benefit. Such an equation, the dissent argued, amounts 
to a denial of a woman’s constitutionally protected right to not have children.18 
The dissent stopped short, however, of permitting full recovery including all 
child rearing costs, in all situations. They recommended following the deci 
sions of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Burke v. Rivo, 19 and 
the Connecticut Supreme Court in Ochs v. Borrelli, 20 which denied recovery 
for child rearing costs when the reason the parents sought sterilization was to 
prevent birth defects or a health risk to the mother, and the resulting preg 
nancy and child were healthy. In this instance, these courts and the Emerson 
dissenters reasoned, the harm the parents sought to prevent had in fact not 
happened, so for them the healthy child could not be considered a foreseeable 
and compensable injury. 
the feminist judgment 
Professor Katharine Silbaugh, writing as Justice Silbaugh, offers a rewritten 
majority opinion that in significant aspects tracks the reasoning of the Emerson 
dissent in adopting the rule of full recovery for all foreseeable damages, 
including child rearing costs for a healthy child. But Silbaugh also signifi 
cantly departs from the dissent, criticizing the Burke and Ochs decisions on 
17 Id. at 414. 
18 Id. at 416 (Bourcier, J., dissenting). The dissent cited Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 
(1975); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as 
establishing the right to decide to not have children. 
19 
551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990). 
20 
445 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982). 
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which it relies as inviting an inquiry into a woman’s reasons for wanting to 
avoid pregnancy that inherently undermines the autonomy of her choice, and 
risks basing recovery on paternalistic value judgments about her reasons for 
not wanting a child. Silbaugh’s opinion is distinctly feminist in two significant 
ways: (1) she relies on liberal feminist theory to assert women’s reproductive 
autonomy and choice21 not to become a parent as a paramount value that is 
not only constitutionally protected, but should also be fully protected by tort 
law; and (2) she focuses on women’s experiences, needs, and perspectives as 
the relevant lens for legal policy, rather than romanticized stereotypes 
divorced from reality about the costless joys of children. 
In contrast with the Emerson majority, which simply concluded that it 
would recognize a cause of action because the overwhelming majority of 
other courts have allowed this claim, Justice Silbaugh analyzes the reasons 
why unwanted pregnancy, even when it results in a healthy child, should be 
considered a compensable harm. She notes that US constitutional law pro 
tects the right to decide not to become a parent not only because of abstract 
interests in autonomy, but also because of the recognition that pregnancy, and 
the mental, physical, and financial strains of child rearing, can in fact harm 
women’s physical health and economic prospects and ability to participate 
equally in society. 
As Silbaugh points out, the joys of pregnancy and child rearing blithely 
assumed by the Emerson majority are not unmitigated. Childbearing can lead 
to economic loss from child rearing costs and diminished career opportun 
ities, and also can be accompanied by physical harm and mental anguish. 
Silbaugh draws on the everyday lived experiences of women, for whom it is 
normal to go to great lengths to avoid pregnancy and its sequelae (i.e. having a 
child), as proof enough of its non benign status. She deftly uses this aspect of 
women’s experience to eviscerate defendant Magendantz’s argument that 
having a child can never be a harm because children invariably bring precious 
joy. The efforts of the vast majority of women routinely to attempt to avoid 
pregnancy for most of their fertile years demonstrates that women do not see 
pregnancy and child rearing as a precious joy that outweighs all its burdens. 
Silbaugh’s focus on the compensable injury as the impairment of repro 
ductive autonomy is significant, because it keeps the focus on the interests of 
the plaintiff who wanted to not have a child, and avoids the conundrum that 
has tripped up judges of whether a healthy child should be considered an 
21 See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory 19–26 (3d 
ed. 2013) (describing liberal feminist legal theory and its focus on women’s autonomy and 
reproductive choice). 
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“injury.” Under Silbaugh’s analysis, when a woman wants to avoid having a 
child for any reason, and seeks sterilization to prevent this outcome, the costs 
of rearing the child that results from the failed sterilization are foreseeable 
consequences of the physician’s negligence toward the woman, regardless of 
whether the child is healthy or disabled. 
Silbaugh’s emphasis on women’s reproductive autonomy and the experien 
tial burdens of pregnancy and child rearing brings into sharp relief the ways in 
which the majority approach denies women the full range of compensation to 
which they would otherwise be entitled by traditional tort law principles 
routinely applied in contexts other than pregnancy. In discussing why the 
so called benefit offset rule should be rejected, Silbaugh notes that conven 
tional negligence law bars the use of a benefit to one type of human interest to 
mitigate damages from harm to a different type of interest, as in using 
emotional benefit to offset economic harm. As she trenchantly points out, 
even when a child does bring great emotional benefit to parents, they cannot 
take these benefits to the bank. That so many courts have misapplied this 
general rule in pregnancy related cases is but another example of the law’s 
difficulty in addressing the complex reality of pregnancy to women’s lives, 
blinded perhaps by a moralistic preference for child bearing. 
Silbaugh’s analysis suggests that the real motivating public policy that leads 
courts to limit recovery seems to be the notion that women are meant to be 
mothers, and that a woman’s desire to avoid childbearing is inevitably mis 
guided in retrospect, because she has failed to embrace the joy. As Silbaugh 
points out, the ideology underlying the cases that deny full recovery is that 
doctors who fail to sterilize a woman have actually done both that woman and 
society a favor. The burdens of children on women become invisible, and the 
logic of women’s reproductive choice not to become a mother becomes, as 
she puts it, “idiosyncratic or selfish.” 
Silbaugh’s feminist embrace of women’s autonomy and respect for their 
reproductive choices also is apparent when she rejects the damages limitation 
endorsed by the dissenters in Emerson. The dissenters embraced full recovery 
for child rearing costs only when the reason a woman wanted to avoid 
pregnancy was to avoid the economic burden of a child. But they rejected 
full recovery when the reason a woman wanted to be sterilized was to avoid a 
disabled child or adverse health effects of pregnancy, and she survived the 
pregnancy and had a nondisabled child. Silbaugh refuses to inquire into the 
motivations for pregnancy prevention and declines to stigmatize some 
choices. She expresses concern that once one starts down the slippery slope 
of privileging some reasons for wanting to avoid pregnancy over others, 
moralistic judgment can inevitably creep into the legal calculation. Her 
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position is far more consistent with valuing autonomy, and it also recognizes 
that even when the wish to avoid pregnancy is based on one set of reasons that 
do not materialize, there can still be an adverse impact of even a healthy child 
on a woman’s economic and social well being 
Silbaugh’s rewritten opinion draws on this complex reality of mothering 
when she exposes the “sentimentality” of the actual opinion’s view of the 
“benefit” of child rearing, imposed at the expense of the mother who may 
experience it in an entirely different fashion. The original decision assumes 
that a woman’s decision not to abort or put the child up for adoption is 
persuasive proof that she considers the child a joyful benefit, completely 
without any economic or emotional burden on her life. By imposing the 
Hobson’s choice of receiving no compensation for the costs of rearing a 
healthy child from the negligent physician, or aborting the pregnancy or 
putting the child up for adoption − choices that may go against personal 
morality − the original Emerson opinion was completely divorced from any 
experiential idea of what pregnancy and mothering involves. 
Silbaugh also recognizes the complex reality of mothering when she criti 
cizes cases, such as the actual Emerson majority, and the Florida decision of 
Fassoulas v. Ramey22 on which it relied, that deny damages for healthy 
children but permit damages for the extraordinary costs of raising a child with 
disabilities. Silbaugh points out that the assumption that a child with disabil 
ities invariably presents burdens that outweigh any benefits is a “breathtaking 
double insult,” both to parents who derive great joy from their children with 
disabilities, and to parents like the Emersons who had good reasons for 
determining that even a healthy child would present too great a burden in 
their lives. 
going further and implications 
If Silbaugh’s reasoning that women’s reproductive autonomy and lived experi 
ences matter more than romanticized stereotypes about mothering had been 
adopted by a state’s highest court in 1997, it could have influenced subsequent 
courts to align recovery in wrongful birth cases with traditional tort principles 
of full recovery for all damages caused by the negligence. Her articulation of 
why childbearing can adversely impact women’s lives, even when they deeply 
love and value their children, has been fully borne out by subsequent socio 
logical research. It is now fully empirically established that the emotional and 
22 
450 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1984). 
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economic burdens of child rearing affect women differently than men. 
Women bear a larger share of the child rearing responsibilities.23 Women also 
experience diminished earnings when they become mothers, while men tend 
to experience increased income when they become fathers.24 This mother 
hood wage penalty is most pronounced in low wage jobs, which exacerbates 
overall gender inequality in wages for the women who can least afford it.25 
With the groundwork laid by Silbaugh, this research could lead even more 
courts to understand why permitting recovery of all the costs of rearing the 
child that results from a negligently performed sterilization is essential to 
redressing the harm and advancing women’s equality. 
In addition to discussing the burdens of child rearing on women, Silbaugh 
could have gone further by more explicitly considering the significant rela 
tional aspects of motherhood on other family members. This concept is 
evidenced by concerns Emerson may have had regarding the impact of 
Kirsten’s birth on her already existing child. Whatever family resources exist 
will now have to be split between the children, as will the parents’ time and 
attention. These are consequences that Emerson went to great lengths to 
avoid, and they could be alleviated by the full recovery for child rearing costs 
adopted in Silbaugh’s feminist rewritten opinion. 
Silbaugh’s forceful advocacy for the full recovery principle also could have 
influenced courts in other countries, which, like the majority in Emerson, 
make concerted efforts to review preexisting cases in order to choose what 
degree of damages to allow. Prior to Emerson, in the United Kingdom, the 
prevailing view was that the normal tort principle of recovery for all foresee 
able loss applied, and thus child rearing costs were fully compensable. By 
1999 the sentiment in the UK had changed, influenced by the accumulating 
weight of US authority as exemplified by Emerson. In  1999, the House of 
Lords, at that time the supreme appellate court that declared binding law for 
all civil cases in the UK, ruled in Macfarlane and Another v. Tayside Health 
Board (Scot.),26 that compensation for child rearing costs and diminished 
post birth income would no longer be recoverable. This was a case where a 
23 Jill E. Yavorsky, Claire M. Kamp Dush, & Sarah J. Schoppe-Sullivan, Production of Inequality: 
Gender Division of Labor across the Transition to Parenthood, 77 J. Marriage & Fam. 662, 663 
(2015). 
24 Michelle J. Budig & Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66 Am. Soc. Rev. 204 
(2001). 
25 Michelle J. Budig, The Fatherhood Bonus and the Motherhood Penalty: Parenthood and the 
Gender Gap in Pay, Third Way (Sept. 2, 2014) https://www.thirdway.org/report/the-fatherhood-
bonus-and-the-motherhood-penalty-parenthood-and-the-gender-gap-in-pay 
26 [2000] 2 AC 59 (HL) (appeal taken from Scot.). 
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vasectomy performed on the husband failed, and the wife became pregnant 
and bore a fifth child that the couple alleged they could not afford. Since the 
MacFarlane court surveyed the American cases, one wonders what would 
have happened to law on the international scene if Emerson had been decided 
by the feminist Justice Silbaugh? Would it have turned the entire tide of 
British cases post MacFarlane on its head?27 If so, that in turn might have 
influenced courts in the United States to stop insulating negligent defendants 
from the full costs and effects of malpractice when it comes to pregnancy 
generating harms. 
The feminist voice of Justice Silbaugh, focusing on how women actually 
are affected by unwanted pregnancy and child rearing, and valuing women’s 
reproductive autonomy, could have changed the tide depriving women of 
their due, and shielding a defendant from foreseeable acts of malpractice. The 
rewritten feminist opinion reminds us that to accomplish this end, a diversity 
of judicial voices influenced by feminist theory certainly counts. 
EMERSON  v .  MAGENDANTZ  , 6 8 9  A .  2 D 4 0 9  
( R . I .  1 9 9 7  ) 
justice katharine b. silbaugh delivered 
the opinion for the court 
On April 27, 1995, Justice Ragosta of the superior court certified two questions 
of law to this court pursuant to R.I. G.L. § 9 24 27: 
1. Is there a cause of action under Rhode Island law when a physician 
negligently performs a sterilization procedure and the patient subse 
quently becomes pregnant and delivers a child? 
2. If so, what is the measure of damages? 
The facts giving rise to these certified questions may be summarized as 
follows from the pleadings and the documents filed by the parties in the 
superior court and in this court. 
Following the birth of her first child, plaintiff Diane Emerson made a 
decision not to have more children and sought medical intervention to 
prevent any future conceptions. Emerson was motivated by a desire to avoid 
the expenses associated with supporting a larger family. She chose to undergo 
27 In 2003 Australia reversed the trend back when the court in Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003) 
215 CLR 1 (Austl.), held the negligent doctor could be held responsible for the costs of raising 
and maintaining a healthy child. 
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a tubal ligation surgical procedure performed by defendant Henry 
Magendantz, MD, a gynecologist who advised Emerson about her steriliza 
tion options. Magendantz failed to advise Emerson about the risks of failure 
from a tubal ligation at any time before or after surgery. 
A few months after her sterilization surgery, Emerson discovered that she 
was pregnant, despite her tubal ligation. She gave birth to Kirsten Emerson in 
early 1992, after which she chose to undergo a second tubal ligation surgery. 
Emerson and her husband filed a complaint against Magendantz alleging that 
his negligence both in performing the procedure and in failing to inform 
Emerson of any postsurgical risk of becoming pregnant led to significant 
damage to each of them. Emerson alleged that she suffered severe pain from 
pregnancy and childbirth as well as from additional invasive medical treat 
ment pursuant to both the pregnancy and the second tubal ligation. In 
addition, both Emersons alleged that they have suffered mental anguish and 
distress arising from the unwanted pregnancy, as well as lost wages and earning 
capacity associated with both the pregnancy and the additional child rearing 
burdens of a second child. Finally, the complaint alleges that Magendantz’s 
negligence has imposed on the Emersons an obligation to expend substantial 
resources for the medical care and child rearing expenses of Kirsten, who has 
already required substantial resources due to severe congenital health issues. 
Magendantz moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that there is no 
cognizable claim for wrongful pregnancy under Rhode Island law, and in 
response to that motion, Justice Ragosta certified the two questions to us. 
i is there a cause of action under rhode island law 
when a physician negligently performs a sterilization 
procedure and the patient subsequently becomes 
pregnant and delivers a child? 
The question posed is an issue of first impression in this state. Of the 
numerous courts that have considered the question, however, all but one 
recognize a cause of action for negligent performance of sterilization proced 
ures whether performed on a woman or on a man.1 
The thirty five other states that have allowed the claim vary widely, how 
ever, in their treatment of the appropriate measure of damages. While the near 
unanimity of courts that recognize the claim might lead us to provide a 
cursory affirmative answer to the first certified issue, the relationship between 
The lone case to deny a cause of action for negligent performance of sterilization procedures is 
Szekeres v. Robinson, 715 P.2d 1076 (Nev. 1986). 
1 
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the first and the second issue is too tightly woven to allow us this cursory 
answer. We conclude that an examination of the reasoning for and against a 
cause of action is essential to understanding the contours of the wrong, which 
in turn informs the appropriate measure of damages. 
Defendant Magendantz argues in his brief that Rhode Island should decline 
to recognize a cause of action in these situations because viewing the birth of a 
child as a legally compensable injury is “offensive to the public sentiment that 
the birth of a child is one of life’s most precious gifts.” Yet according to this logic, 
Magendantz has taken it as his professional medical calling voluntarily to 
perform elective sterilization procedures that have as their sole purpose depriv 
ing adults of, in his own words, “one of life’s most precious gifts.” We cannot 
comprehend why Magendantz would offer sterilization services if he believed 
his own argument, and we consider his routine medical practice evidence that 
he does not. Further, extending the logic of his argument, were Magendantz to 
fail each time he contracted to perform a sterilization procedure, his medical 
ineptitude would actually have bestowed a precious benefit on his poorly served 
patients. Indeed, one Pennsylvania court that denied a cause of action in 
contract for these cases offered just such a rationale: “To allow damages in a 
suit such as this would mean that the physician would have to pay for the fun, 
joy, and affection which plaintiff[] will have in the rearing and education of 
[their] fifth child.” Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D & C. 2d 41, 45 46 (1957). This 
reasoning seems to cast a woman’s desire to avoid prospective parentage as 
always misguided retrospectively. 
But the law firmly respects and protects a woman’s autonomous decision 
not to have children, and recognizes that interference with this decision 
undoubtedly can lead to harm. In 1965, the United States Supreme Court 
recognized that a married couple’s decision to prevent conception during 
sexual relations is a constitutionally protected right. Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1965). The court did not explore in depth the reasons that a 
couple would decide against procreation, defending instead a privacy of 
decision making in doing so. Yet it is difficult to see how the prevention of 
pregnancy can be a coherent decision worthy of constitutional protection if it 
were not possible for pregnancy especially an unwanted one − to be a harm. 
Indeed, in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the court articulated the harm a 
pregnancy can impose on a woman who does not wish to bear a child, and 
that reasoning bears repeating in response to defendant Magendantz’s argu 
ment that “the birth of a child is one of life’s most precious gifts”: 
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by 
denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm 
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medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or 
additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. 
Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be 
taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with 
the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family 
already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. 
Id. at 153 
When the Supreme Court later confirmed the basic holding of Roe in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), it again 
connected women’s economic and social well being to reproductive control, 
confirming that the “ability of women to participate equally in the economic 
and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their 
reproductive lives.” Id. at 836. Applying this insight, Emerson’s decision to 
prevent conception through sterilization could understandably be made to 
enhance her economic and social prospects, and so the pregnancy in question 
can inflict damages to those interests. Limiting future reproduction is an 
essential component of autonomy and liberty for women. Interfering with it 
through medical negligence therefore logically inflicts a grave harm. 
The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade carefully evaluated a balancing of 
interests, including women’s right to control their own reproductive lives and 
the state’s interest in protecting potential life, then confirmed that balancing 
more recently in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Given these decisions, it 
would be remarkable were this court to accept Magendantz’s argument that 
bearing a child that a woman had undergone surgery to prevent placed only 
blessings, and no countervailing burdens, on that woman. Magendantz’s 
contention that it would offend public policy to recognize a cause of action 
precisely because it would “declare that a birth is a legally compensable 
injury,” flies in the face of the very reasons articulated in Roe for protecting 
a woman’s reproductive choice: bearing and raising a child can be injurious to 
a woman, and it is for her to evaluate the potential benefits and burdens to her 
of that pregnancy given her individual life circumstances and experiences, as 
well as her personal valuation of them based on her values and interests. 
In short, a negligently performed sterilization that results in an unwanted 
pregnancy and birth of a child inflicts an “injury” because tort law defines 
injury as “invasion[s] of any legally protected interest of another.” 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 7(I) (Am. Law Inst. 1965). 
A woman’s autonomous right to decide whether or not to become pregnant 
and have a child has been recognized as an interest legally protected by the 
US Constitution for over thirty years. 
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Defendant further argues that recognizing the Emersons’ claim would be 
inconsistent with 10 R.I Gen. Laws § 7 1, which recognizes that the loss of a 
viable fetus is a compensable wrong. In his brief, Magendantz asserts that to 
“allow parents to claim that it is not the death or injury, but the birth of a child 
that is a wrong amounts to a seemingly insurmountable paradox.” But it is no 
paradox at all when one recognizes that on balance some pregnancies confer a 
benefit and some a burden according to a woman’s circumstances and values. 
The reproductive rights cases are premised on that logic. 
In essence, defendant’s reasoning that a child is always a blessing and a 
benefit would render a woman’s exercise of her constitutionally protected 
right not to reproduce both illogical and invisible. We decline to ignore the 
clear implication of the rights afforded women to make reproductive deci 
sions: often, the birth of a child does inflict an injury, one of enough 
significance to overcome the government interests expressed in those cases. 
Thus, a woman can have compelling and constitutionally protected reasons 
for wanting to avoid pregnancy by obtaining a tubal ligation. The failure of the 
medical procedure due to negligence inflicts a direct injury recognized in the 
articulation of the constitutional right of reproductive autonomy, and this 
right surely deserves recognition in the private law of torts. The interests 
invaded by Dr. Magendantz’s malpractice have analogs across tort law, and 
appreciation of the right invaded helps us to evaluate the second certified 
question: how should damages for this cause of action be measured? 
ii if so, what is the measure of damages? 
Perhaps in anticipation of our decision to follow the overwhelming majority of 
states that recognize a cause of action for pregnancy resulting from a failed 
sterilization due to negligence, both parties focus their attention on the 
measure of damages. As a general matter, a defendant physician is liable for 
all foreseeable damages to a plaintiff patient for medical malpractice in the 
provision of medical care. On the issue of compensable damages for this cause 
of action, however, there is little consensus among other jurisdictions, yet the 
distinctions they have entertained provide us with a range of alternatives for 
answering this question. The larger set of jurisdictions allow for limited 
recovery, while a smaller set of jurisdictions permit more expansive recovery. 
Standard rules of proximate cause and foreseeability point toward recovery 
for all categories of ordinary damages in a case where medical malpractice 
leads to losses. Medical malpractice actions frequently include recovery for 
medical expenses, pain and suffering, emotional distress, lost wages, and other 
foreseeable economic harm. We use as a starting premise in determining what 
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measure of damages should be permitted to a victim of medical malpractice 
the same unquestioned basic common law rule of damages that we have 
applied in all negligence cases for centuries. We have always permitted the 
victim of a negligent tortfeasor to recover for all of the injuries and damages 
that can be proven to have been reasonably foreseeable and proximately 
caused by the tortfeasor's negligence. Atlantic Tubing & Rubber Co. 
v. International Engraving Co., 528 F.2d 1272 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 817 (1976); Hueston v. Narragansett Tennis Club, Inc., 502 A.2d 827, 
830 (R.I. 1986); Prue v. Goodrich Oil Co., 140 A. 665, 666 (R. I. 1928). See also 
Restatement (Second) Torts § 917 (1979); 1 Minzer,  Nates,  
Kimball, Axelrod & Goldstein, Damages in Tort Actions, 
chs. 1, 2 (1996); 4 Harper, James, & Gray, The Law of Torts, §§20.4, 
20.5 at 130 39 (2d ed. 1986). 
In the case of failed sterilization procedures, however, a majority of juris 
dictions have departed from this rule. Only two states, New Mexico and 
Wisconsin, follow traditional tort principles to permit the recovery of all 
damages foreseeably and proximately caused by the negligent defendant. 
Lovelace Med. Ctr. v. Mendez, 805 P.2d 603 (N.M. 1991); Marciniak 
v. Lundborg, 450 N.W.2d 243 (Wisc. 1990). The most common position across 
jurisdictions that recognize this cause of action is to allow recovery for a 
limited set of damages, primarily for expenses related to the unwanted preg 
nancy and birth of the child, but not including recovery for the costs of child 
rearing. 
Under the limited recovery rule, jurisdictions frequently grant compensa 
tion to the plaintiffs for the medical expenses of the ineffective sterilization 
procedure, for the medical and hospital costs of the pregnancy, for the expense 
of a subsequent sterilization procedure, for loss of wages, and sometimes for 
emotional distress arising out of the unwanted pregnancy and loss of consor 
tium to the spouse arising out of the unwanted pregnancy. They also generally 
include medical expenses for prenatal care, delivery, and postnatal care. In 
other words, these damages are highly limited in time, focused on the events 
surrounding the pregnancy and childbirth. The type of harm is not the 
sticking point for these states, but rather continuing the damages paid through 
out the child’s minority for ongoing expenses. We think that the length of time 
that the plaintiffs will suffer economic harm is hardly a meaningful limitation. 
If it is daunting for a court to imagine the awesome expenses associated with 
raising a child to the age of majority, we are cognizant that these expenses are 
in fact imposed on the plaintiff by the defendant’s negligence. 
The reasons for limiting recovery vary. Some courts claim that calculating 
the actual damage to parents requires an unacceptable level of speculation. 
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For example, the Supreme Court of Washington in McKernan v. Aasheim, 
687 P.2d 850 (Wash. 1984), has made some pertinent comments: 
We believe that it is impossible to establish with reasonable certainty whether 
the birth of a particular healthy, normal child damaged its parents. Perhaps 
the costs of rearing and educating the child could be determined through use 
of actuarial tables or similar economic information. But whether these costs 
are outweighed by the emotional benefits which will be conferred by that 
child cannot be calculated. The child may turn out to be loving, obedient 
and attentive, or hostile, unruly and callous. The child may grow up to be 
President of the United States, or to be an infamous criminal. In short, it is 
impossible to tell, at an early stage in the child's life, whether its parents have 
sustained a net loss or net gain. 
Id. at 8552 
This court’s cautionary qualifier that “perhaps” child rearing costs might be 
able to be calculated is entirely unwarranted. Actuarial tables and economic 
information about the costs of raising a child are readily available through 
numerous federal and state agencies. The United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) has produced an annual report since 1960 on the expend 
iture on children by families. The Bureau of Labor Statistics gathers consumer 
expenditure statistics often used by state level child welfare agencies to set a 
benchmark for child support. The costs of education are carefully tracked by 
governmental education departments and accrediting agencies and financial 
institutions, and are routinely calculated when making investment and finan 
cial aid determinations. When compared with pain and suffering damages, 
emotional distress damages, or loss of consortium damages, the lifetime cost of 
raising and educating a child is relatively easy to calculate. We are not 
persuaded that this element of damage requires so much speculation that 
we should depart from our ordinary practices. 
As for the expressed concern about the speculative value to the parents of 
the child’s accomplishments, the difficulty of commensurability pervades 
remedies in tort law. See Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and 
Commensurability, 43 Duke L.J. 56 86 (1993). For example, we allow 
recovery for wrongful death, yet we know that no amount of money replaces 
a loved one whose life is ended due to the negligence of another. When we 
This argument assumes that a parent receives an economic benefit, a “net gain,” from a child’s 
accomplishment, such as becoming president of the United States. There was a time when the 
legal status of the child included ownership of the child’s productivity, see, e.g., Viviana 
Zelizer, Pricing the Priceless Child (1985), but the law of the family has developed 
beyond that kind of calculation, as we discuss at greater length below. 
2 
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allow recovery for loss of consortium or for pain and suffering, we contemplate 
substituting financial payments under circumstances where we realize that 
those payments are not direct equivalents to the loss at hand. Only a failure of 
imagination lets us see the need for monetary damages for those losses, yet 
prevents us from grasping the harms and ongoing economic costs associated 
with a pregnancy by an individual who underwent surgery to prevent it. 
Other jurisdictions explicitly depart from the normal proximate cause rules 
in medical malpractice actions based on faulty sterilization for policy reasons 
that aren’t always clearly articulated. In Johnson v. University Hospitals of 
Cleveland, 540 N.E.2d 1370, 1377 (Ohio 1989), the Supreme Court of Ohio, 
after considering rules adopted by the various states, suggested that it would 
not mechanically apply the rules of proximate cause and foreseeability 
because the “strict rules of tort should not be applied to an action to which 
they are not suited, such as a wrongful pregnancy case, in which a doctor's 
tortious conduct permits to occur the birth of a child rather than the causing 
of an injury.” Id. at 1378. In  Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 447 N.E.2d 385 
(Ill. 1983), the Supreme Court of Illinois stated that they would not “rigidly 
and unemotionally . . . apply the tort concept that a tortfeasor should be liable 
for all of the costs he has brought upon the plaintiffs,” because, as Justice 
Holmes famously stated, “the life of the law is not logic but experience,” and 
their experience led them to conclude that it was more reasonable to deny 
child rearing costs than to “abstractly apply[] a rule not suited for the circum 
stances in this character of case.” Id. at 390. 
We are unpersuaded that requiring a physician who commits malpractice 
to pay for all foreseeable consequences of that malpractice demonstrates either 
an emotional or an unusually rigid, strict, or abstractly formalistic response to 
the circumstances of the case. We do agree, though, that the life of the law is 
not based solely on logic, but also on experience. In our experience, a person 
who seeks surgical intervention to avoid becoming pregnant has taken a 
difficult step consistent with her understanding, born of experience, that the 
birth of a child would dramatically alter her life course, emotionally, socially, 
and economically. When these significant and foreseeable costs are imposed 
on her as a result of medical malpractice, justice requires us to take notice. 
While some courts consider the damages too speculative, and others argue 
that they should be rejected for policy reasons grounded in experience or 
reasonableness, most courts focus on the idea that the birth of a child 
following an unwanted pregnancy confers an emotional benefit of such value 
that it washes away the costs of raising that child. Joy is in equipoise with 
burden, nullifying losses associated with child rearing against choice. The 
courts that take this approach do acknowledge that the costs of child rearing 
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can be a compensable loss, but balance against these costs the benefits derived 
by the parents, either economic or emotional, from having a healthy child. 
See, e.g., Univ. of Ariz. Health Sciences Centr. v. Superior Court of Ariz., 667 
P.2d 1294 (Ariz. 1983); Ochs v. Borrelli, 445 A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982); Burke 
v. Rivo, 551 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1990). Ordinarily, these courts intuit that the 
values are equal. 
These courts refer to this offset as the “benefit rule.” According to this rule, 
when, in addition to inflicting an injury on a plaintiff, a defendant also 
simultaneously confers a benefit on that plaintiff, the benefit should be 
subtracted from the burden in the calculation of damages. This reasoning 
would preclude granting rearing costs for a healthy child whose parents have 
decided to forego the option of adoption and have decided to retain and raise 
the child with all the joys and benefits that presumably are derived from 
parenthood. According to this reasoning, their decision to forego the option 
of releasing the child for adoption constitutes persuasive evidence that the 
parents consider the benefit of retaining the child to outweigh the economic 
costs of child rearing. See, e.g., Fassoulas v. Ramey, 450 So.2d 822 (Fla. 1984). 
Courts that rely on this benefit rule cite to the Restatement (Second) 
Torts § 920 (Am. Law Inst.1979), which provides: 
When the defendant’s tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to 
his property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of 
the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered 
in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is equitable. 
[emphasis added] 
These jurisdictions reason that this provision provides for full recovery for all 
damages proximately resulting from a physician’s negligence, while also 
permitting the factfinder to mitigate or reduce any damage award by what 
may be proven to be the value of the benefit conferred upon the plaintiff 
parent or parents by the birth of the child. Yet the Restatement only 
permits offsetting of damages by benefits to the same interest of the plaintiff 
that was harmed. That is to say, economic benefits may be subtracted from 
economic harms, emotional benefits from emotional harms. The 
Restatement does not support the offsetting of interests that are different 
in type, such as the economic loss of child rearing costs offset with the 
emotional gains of having a child. Comment b to Restatement § 920 
makes this explicit, giving as examples that a court cannot offset economic 
gain to reduce pain and suffering damages, nor can a court reduce damages 
for loss of consortium because a spouse is no longer obligated to economically 
support the lost loved one. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted in 
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Marciniak, “[p]roperly applied in the negligent sterilization context, the ‘same 
interest’ rule would require that the economic damages involved in raising the 
child be offset by corresponding economic benefits, and that emotional harms 
be offset by emotional benefits, and so on.” 450 N.W.2d at  249. See Joseph 
S. Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life, 31 U. Miami 
L. Rev. 1409, 1415 (1977). This court reasoned that the parents presumably 
knew what emotional benefits they were foregoing by not having a child, and 
that it would be unfair "to not only force this benefit upon them but to tell 
them they must pay for it as well .” Id. The court also declined to offset 
economic benefits because it deemed any economic benefits that a child 
might bring to parents to be insignificant. Id. 
This case illustrates the wisdom of the “same interest” limitation on the 
“benefit rule.” To the extent that raising a child confers the emotional benefits 
so hoped for by these courts, there is simply no way to take those emotional 
benefits to the bank when a wronged plaintiff seeks to house, clothe, feed, and 
educate the child that results from defendant’s negligence. Even at the most 
practical level, these jurisdictions ignore the reasons that the offset benefits 
must be limited to the same interests. 
The “benefit rule” is problematic for additional reasons, linked to our 
answer to the first certified question. Courts that rush past meaningful evalu 
ation of why there must be a cause of action in these cases − because there is a 
real harm to a fundamental constitutionally protected interest in reproductive 
autonomy − fail to recognize that the exercise of the constitutionally protected 
decision to avoid pregnancy is entirely routine in the experience of women. 
A woman who chooses not to become pregnant believes that for her, in her 
life circumstances, a child is a greater burden than benefit. By focusing on the 
benefits of raising children, some courts appear to minimize the burdens of 
caregiving, as if a labor of love is both priceless and costless. Caregivers know 
otherwise. Not only does the care of children require enormous financial 
resources of parents, but it also exacts additional financial opportunity costs, 
impairing a parent’s earning capacity. Women’s earning capacity is particu 
larly adversely impacted by having children. In addition, the emotional 
content of caregiving is both joyful and burdensome, such that even the 
nonfinancial aspects of parenting cannot be assumed to keep a parent “in 
the black.” Attachment and responsibility exact pain and suffering on parents 
just as they impart joy. 
Courts that deploy soaring rhetoric to the effect that life’s greatest joys are 
found in child rearing make a person’s decision not to have children, or 
additional children, seem idiosyncratic or selfish, as if it were an error from 
which she was fortuitously rescued by the defendant’s malpractice. This belies 
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how ordinary it is for people to seek to prevent pregnancy. Day in and day out, 
countless individuals, women in particular, go to great lengths to prevent 
pregnancy, not out of a large scale miscalculation of benefits and burdens, 
but after a considered judgment about that balance. Although children can be 
joyful, the sheer regularity of the choice to prevent pregnancy suggests that the 
balance is often tilted toward burden. Those courts that invoke the “benefit 
rule” substitute their own feelings about children for the clearly revealed 
preference of every patient who seeks sterilization procedures. This is senti 
mentality, not justice. 
Just as courts romanticize the benefits of children in order to deny malprac 
tice victims compensation for their costs, some courts also demean the value 
of children with disabilities by recognizing that for them, unlike for a non 
disabled child, a parent has been harmed by the imposition of an unwanted 
pregnancy and can recover for lifelong expenses. For example, in Fassoulas 
v. Ramey, supra, the Florida Supreme Court rejected child rearing costs for a 
normal healthy child after a failed vasectomy, but observed that in the case of a 
child with a physical or a mental disability, special medical and educational 
expenses beyond normal rearing costs should be allowed because the “finan 
cial and emotional drain associated with raising such a child is often over 
whelming to the affected parents.” Fassoulas, 450 So. 2d at  824. 
How quickly the Florida court turns from characterizing the birth of a child 
as a blessing and a joy, to comprehending that raising a child can pose a 
financial and emotional drain that overwhelms affected parents. According to 
the Florida court, a child with a disability is an injury, while a healthy child is 
not. We reject this reasoning because it is a breathtaking double insult, both to 
parents who derive tremendous joy from children with disabilities and to the 
many parents of healthy children who find that the financial and emotional 
strain of a healthy child is not worth the joys, and who therefore, like the 
Emersons, seek to prevent the birth of future children. 
Magendantz seeks to avoid even the costs of raising a child with a disability. 
He urges that if we adopt the reasoning in Fassoulas, we should limit it by 
holding that only where a physician is placed on notice, in performing a 
sterilization procedure, that the parents have a reasonable expectation of 
giving birth to a child with a physical or a mental disability, should the entire 
cost of raising such a child be within the ambit of recoverable damages. While 
Kirsten Emerson was born with a disability that increases the Emersons’ 
expenses compared with a healthy child, the Emersons were not motivated 
by fear of disability when they sought sterilization. They were motivated by 
economic concerns, feeling that they could not afford the ordinary child 
rearing costs of a second child, whether perfectly healthy or not. By 
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defendant’s logic, because the Emersons sought to avoid any expenses from 
raising children, they should not be able to recover the greater expenses 
associated with Kirsten’s disability, nor any of her ordinary child rearing 
expenses. 
Some courts have based their recovery rules on the reasons that a plaintiff 
wished to avoid a pregnancy. For example, in Burke v. Rivo, the court held 
that there is no harm when a patient seeks sterilization to avoid giving birth to 
a child with a disability, and a failed sterilization leads to the birth of a healthy 
child. The Massachusetts court allows recovery for child rearing costs of a 
healthy child only if the plaintiff can show that she sought the sterilization for 
financial reasons. Ostensibly, this rule avoids paying child rearing expenses 
where a patient might want to raise a child, but seeks to avoid pain and 
complications from pregnancy and delivery. Burke, 551 N.E.2d at  5 6. 
We think the search for motivations for a sterilization procedure cannot be 
administered without inviting speculation or self serving testimony, or a dis 
tasteful interrogation of patients prior to their seeking sterilization procedures. 
Accordingly, we decline to structure an inquiry into the motivations for 
preventing a pregnancy, just as we decline to base damages recovery on the 
value placed on one child over another. Given how widespread and routine 
the desire to prevent pregnancy is, we recognize that many individuals have 
multiple overlapping reasons to prevent a pregnancy, and an effort to sort out 
these reasons may unnecessarily stigmatize some reasons and pathologize this 
routine choice. We instead choose to follow the holdings in both New Mexico 
and Wisconsin, the two jurisdictions that follow traditional tort rules and allow 
recovery for all foreseeable damages arising from malpractice in this context by 
adopting a full recovery rule without offsetting either the economic or the 
emotional benefits to be derived from having a healthy child. Mendez, 805 
P.2d at  611 15; Marciniak, 450 N.W.2d at  247 50. 
Understanding the reasons for allowing the cause of action in the first 
instance aids in considering the appropriate measure of damages. Once we 
appreciate that the benefit theory can be characterized as ideological rather 
than factual, in that it resists entirely the logic of exercising reproductive 
freedom by choosing sterilization, we can set aside its strained application to 
these cases and resort to the conventional rules of tort damages. 
These cases have puzzled courts unnecessarily. One issue in particular, 
raised in a number of courts, requires our comment. Some courts go about 
assuming the benefit of a child to a plaintiff by noting that the plaintiff had an 
opportunity to either terminate her pregnancy or place her child for adoption. 
The fact that she chose instead to raise her child, say these courts, proves that 
the child is more benefit than burden. See Univ. of Ariz. Health Sciences Ctr., 
312 Emerson v. Magendantz 
667 P.2d 1294; Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429 (Md. 1984); Sherlock 
v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977). 
Emerson sought sterilization to avoid being presented with either of these 
options. She may have known she would not choose to terminate a pregnancy. 
The right recognized in Roe v. Wade, and reaffirmed in Casey, is the right to 
decide whether or not to terminate a pregnancy, and a woman should not be 
penalized by tort law for whichever she decides to do. Emerson is already 
parent to a child, and may not have wanted her child to experience the loss of 
a sibling placed for adoption. This hardly negates the costs of raising Kirsten. 
Emerson may have feared that given Kirsten’s disability, she would not find 
care as dedicated as the Emersons would provide. Emerson may have pre 
dicted that despite the expenses of raising a child, she would experience an 
emotional attachment that would make placing the child for adoption 
impossible. 
Courts who resist this cause of action also sometimes argue that it is a 
dignitary harm to a child to have a parent litigate their birth as an injury. 
Courts most often express this concern when the parents of a healthy child 
seek damages; their corresponding silence when parents seek compensation 
for an unwanted pregnancy that results in a child with a disability speaks 
volumes about the value judgments being made about children with disabil 
ities. This professed concern about the psychological impact of a lawsuit on 
the child ignores the fact that the financial costs of child rearing are real even 
to a parent with tremendous attachment to a child, perhaps even because of 
that attachment, which may fuel self sacrifice for which the Emersons did not 
volunteer. As the court noted in Marciniak, the parents’: 
suit is for costs of raising the child, not to rid themselves of an unwanted 
child. They obviously want to keep the child. The love, affection, and 
emotional support any child needs they are prepared to give. But the love, 
affection and emotional support they are prepared to give do not bring with 
them the economic means that are also necessary to feed, clothe, educate 
and otherwise raise the child. 
450 N.W.2d at  246 
It would be unrealistic and callous to recharacterize the parents’ dilemma of 
attachment as a benefit pure and simple, much less a benefit cancelling out 
the extraordinary financial burdens of child rearing. To do so would once 
again resist the logic that drives the overwhelming majority of women to, 
under some circumstances and for some period of time, seek out a variety of 
means to avoid pregnancy and childbirth. Cognizance of that logic requires 
that we fully compensate the Emersons for their damages. 
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For these reasons, we answer the certified questions as follows: 
1. When a physician negligently performs a sterilization and there is a 
subsequent pregnancy and child, the patient has a cause of action for 
medical malpractice. 
2. The measure of damages is the same as in any other malpractice action, 
and should include all foreseeable damages including the costs of 
rearing the child to adulthood, regardless of whether the child is born 
healthy or with a disability. Any emotional benefits that the child brings 
to the parents should not be offset against the economic costs of child 
rearing. 
